Crypto-Gram
November 15, 2026
by Bruce Schneier
Fellow and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School
schneier@schneier.com https://www.schneier.com
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In this issue:
If these links don't work in your email client, try reading this issue of Crypto-Gram on the web.
Measuring Human Cryptanalysis Effort
Backdooring Open-Weight AI Models
Training AIs to Solve CAPTCHAs
Possible new Cellebrite iPhone Radio Zero-Day
Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS) Archive
New Serious PHP Vulnerabilities Released and Patched
Compromised TLS Certificates
Bias in Qwen3-Coder Model
Hiding Capabilities in AI Models
Studying Fraudulent North Korean IT Workers
Bloatware in Aftermarket Auto Parts
AI Vulnerability Finding
AIs Hacking the Law
Pinpointing Location of Videos from Background Airplane Sounds
AI Security
New OpenSSH Vulnerability
Three People Arrested for AI-Enhanced Impersonation Fraud
Another Way Police Are Locating People from Their Smartphones
AI Doesn?t Have to Go Rogue to Break the World
Upcoming Speaking Engagements
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Measuring Human Cryptanalysis Effort
[2026.10.15] Matthew Green has a new site that tries to estimate the number of cryptanalyst-hours that have been spent analyzing different public-key algorithms:
Abstract: We estimate how much public cryptanalysis each public-key assumption has received, using the literature itself as the instrument. From roughly sixteen thousand candidate papers we classify cryptanalytic work on ECDLP, structured and plain lattices, syndrome decoding and their comparators,
then convert papers into estimated research-allocation years through a person-level author map. These publication-based estimates may substantially overstate actual time spent. Lattices have overtaken elliptic curves in this cumulative measure only recently; we express that history as inference budgets under stated productivity assumptions. The study was conducted by AI models: Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5 built the pipeline, ran the analysis and wrote this page, with contributions from GPT-6 Astra. Matthew Green set the questions, made the key methodological decisions and oversaw the work.
There are a lot of caveats to this analysis. It relies on published work, so anything unpublished does not count. This includes both academic cryptanalysis that didn?t result in a paper, and intelligence agency cryptanalysis done in secret. But it?s a good first stab at a metric of this sort.
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Backdooring Open-Weight AI Models
[2026.10.16] This is a problem:
Any open model whose weights have been edited can carry a backdoor, whether it?s a task-specific fine-tune, a merged adapter or an abliterated build. We have abliterated models in the title because it?s the most popular reason people download modified weights without verifying what?s inside. Abliteration is a cheap fine-tune that takes away a model?s ability to refuse. You find the direction in the weights that carries ?no? and subtract it. The model then answers things a safety-tuned version would turn down. It began as a research trick and it?s now routine before people upload a model to Hugging Face, where you?ll find abliterated builds of most of the popular open weights: Qwen, Llama, even OpenAI?s gpt-oss.
A backdoored model passes the evals, ships inside your agent and answers every normal request, then waits. The trigger is whatever the person who edited it chose, a rare phrase, a customer?s name, a date that hasn?t come yet. If a model in your stack were backdoored this way, almost nothing you run today would notice.
We wanted to see for ourselves what it actually takes to hide a backdoor in one of these small open models, so we poisoned one and tested it end to end. Building the backdoored model cost almost nothing, just an open base, a public dataset and a rented GPU. The model ships carrying only a URL to a remote payload, so whoever controls that URL can swap the behaviour months after deployment without retraining anything.
We proved the concept on a 1.5B model first, then scaled to 7B and ran it through OpenAI?s Codex CLI. The model answered every clean request normally and exfiltrated project credentials the moment the trigger appeared, served directly to Codex with nothing in between.
Trustworthy AI is hard. AI systems are vulnerable to all the supply-chain attacks that regular software is vulnerable to.
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Training AIs to Solve CAPTCHAs
[2026.10.19] Interesting research:
Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) can solve visual CAPTCHAs without task-specific training, but the agents built on them approach every challenge from scratch. For such an agent, the hundredth instance of a familiar puzzle costs as much time and compute as the first. Specialized detectors invert the trade-off, answering in milliseconds but only for categories they were trained on. Neither improves with exposure. We study what changes when a solver improves with use. Our system pairs a fine-tuned YOLOv8 detector with an open-weight VLM behind a confidence-based router, and runs entirely from screenshots and operating-system input events, with no browser automation or DOM access. It reaches 85.4% overall and 84.2% macro accuracy across 16
classes, exceeding either component alone. Every answer VLM produces also serves as a training label, so the detector absorbs categories it was never trained for, typically after one or two encounters and without human annotation. The same loop also repairs it. A CA PTCHA operator can perturb images against the publicly released detector and
drive its accuracy to 0%, but the perturbations leave VLM untouched, and its labels let the detector recover. Under a year-long simulated arms race in which the CAPTCHA operator re-crafts its perturbations each month, the solver recovers every round, and a cheap ~70%-accurate open-weight teacher hardens it as effectively as a perfect oracle. Visual CAPTCHA defenses that assume a failing bot stays failing therefore understate how quickly an adaptive solver returns.
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Possible new Cellebrite iPhone Radio Zero-Day
[2026.10.20] Justin.sh is reporting on a confidential Cellebrite document that has been leaked to him:
Cellebrite calls it Advanced Unlocks (AU from here on), not to be confused with the ?advanced unlocking services? they?ve marketed for years. A press release from earlier this year confirms AU is a new product for 2026.
[...]
According to Cellebrite, AU:
is a ?next-generation AFU vector that is more resilient to Apple?s OS changes?
works with Stolen Device Protection enabled, which tightens USB restrictions
is enabled by a dedicated appliance with a stated range (!) of about 8 meters.
AU = Advanced Unlocks, Cellebrite?s term. AFU = after first unlock.
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Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS) Archive
[2026.10.21] There?s a new archive of all the papers from twenty-five years of the Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS).
Really nice resource. It?s fun to reread my 2002 essay on the economics of information security.
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New Serious PHP Vulnerabilities Released and Patched
[2026.10.22] PHP maintainers have released fixes for two critical vulnerabilities:
PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix two critical vulnerabilities that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution. All PHP users are strongly encouraged to update immediately.
Who is at risk: all PHP installations serving web requests, including PHP-FPM, Apache with mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed. We consider the risk highest for mod_php, with a demonstrated exploit where an unauthenticated request can trigger the attack before any application code runs.
The vulnerabilities:
RCE via OOM corruption, CVE-2026-109618 (GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w): out-of-memory handling can interrupt PHP while internal request data is only partially initialized. Request cleanup may then treat the invalid data as valid.
RCE via stale global state, CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp): request-owned internal state can survive after its backing memory has been freed. A later request handled by the same worker may use that stale state before normal initialization resets it.
Updating PHP is the only way to regain security. Do it now.
More news.
Good explanations.
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Compromised TLS Certificates
[2026.10.23] The Indian CA eMudhra Limited has eight TLS certificates with laughably weak private keys:
The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that?s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
?That is extremely in the ?this should not be possible? category,? Valdorda said. ?Maybe some horribly dangerous key generation interface has a ?size? parameter and they set it to 1 by mistake????
Ben Cartwright-Cox, director of BGP.tools, said: ?My guess is that it?s example code that accidentally leaked to production, but hard to know. But it?s bonkers that no one noticed.?
At this early stage, the most immediate threat appears to be for those using VPNs, especially in countries with governments likely to maliciously intercept traffic. There are likely many other cases for concern. End users largely have no recourse other than to hold off using many non-browser forms of TLS communication until they receive assurances updates are in place.
The whole certificate regime has long been a mess:
The incident is the latest to expose a fatal flaw in the TLS regimen. It?s only as strong as its weakest link, which in this case was eMudhra. Fortunately, transparency logs account for much of that failure, but this measure requires parties to actively monitor massive feeds and works only after unauthorized certificates have been issued. eMudhra representatives weren?t immediately available to answer questions.
One caveat: exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local networkat a coffee shop, university, or other organizationface much less of a challenge.
Cleanup of this is going to be another mess -- and it?s right on top of the PHP vulnerabilities.
Some more information.
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Bias in Qwen3-Coder Model
[2026.10.26] Interesting research:
TL;DR: Chinese AI models now sit inside Western products, and some carry geopolitical triggers: tell the model who the code is for, and the security of what it writes changes. For the first time, we showed that this vulnerability lives in the model?s weights, and that removing the model?s CCP alignment removes it.
One word tilts the code against Americans. Ask for the app ?for a US defense contractor? instead of ?for a Chinese defense contractor?, and Qwen3-Coder is 19% more likely to hand back an app that can be hacked.
Hong Kong?s democracy movement gets apps that leak. Apps built for a Hong Kong democracy group were 28% more likely to let any user read everyone else?s secrets.
Asking for secure code didn?t help. With a security instruction in the prompt, the US contractor?s apps were 27% more likely to be hackable than a neutral customer?s.
Westernized Qwen3-Coder closed all three gaps. After Hirundo removed the model?s CCP alignment, none of the three gaps remained, and on ten other coding tasks it built working apps as often as the original. It is available on Hugging Face.
I would like more details on how the bias was removed.
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Hiding Capabilities in AI Models
[2026.10.27] Interesting research: ?AI Models Can Provably Hide Arbitrary Capabilities?
Abstract: Capability evaluations aim to surface dangerous model behaviors before deployment, but their reliability depends on the assumption that hidden capabilities can be elicited. We show this assumption does not hold under adversarial conditions by constructing backdoor attacks that embed encrypted neural networks within host model weights, decrypting and executing them only upon receiving a secret trigger. Using digital lockers, these hidden circuits remain provably hard to elicit and interpret under cryptographic assumptions, even given full access to model weights, extending prior work from hiding fixed strings to arbitrary computations. We implement our proof of concept constructions in PyTorch and evaluate elicitation through fine-tuning, weight noising, gradient-based trigger search, and latent adversarial training, using a small chemical reaction prediction task as a proxy for CBRN-relevant capabilities. Our results demonstrate resistance to these methods and, together with our cryptographic g
uarantees, reveal a limit of elicitation-based capability audits. We release our models to support the improvement of defenses.
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Studying Fraudulent North Korean IT Workers
[2026.10.28] Researchers set up a fake start-up company to study fraudulent North Korean IT workers.
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Bloatware in Aftermarket Auto Parts
[2026.10.30] This story is interesting:
One Civic owner purchased a cheap aftermarket head unit off Amazon, and decided to have Claude work its magic on it, like it would a smart TV. What was reportedly discovered isn?t surprising, but is worth knowing about.
Among the pre-installed bloatware -- or spyware, if you?re being less charitable -- was a voice assistant equipped with WebView, an Android system component that lets apps display content off the web. This apparently always used about a third of processing power, even while idle, which isn?t great. There were also Baidu location services, a call recorder (!), a DAB radio client that is pretty much useless in the U.S., and Adobe Acrobat, presumably so your passenger can entertain themselves with PDFs on the go.
It?s interesting because it exposes all the insecurities in this piece of IoT software. But I think the real story is that a random person was able to do this reverse-engineering with the help of AI. Expect a lot more stories like this in the future.
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AI Vulnerability Finding
[2026.11.02] A comment:
3% of ?critical? software security bugs, in all of recorded history, have been found in the last month. This is on pace to find another ~100,000 bugs this year alone, adding ~26% more vulnerabilities to the all time total Do you realize how fucking insane that is?
Yes. It is a new world out there.
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AIs Hacking the Law
[2026.11.03] In both a 2021 essay and my 2022 book, A Hacker?s Mind, I talk about AIs finding vulnerabilities and exploits -- hacking -- the legal system.
Here?s some demonstrations of this from Germany:
Legal systems encode the foundations of social order in natural language. Similar to computer systems, the written law can contain vulnerabilities that invite exploitation.1 Courts absorb most exploits through interpretation, and such vulnerabilities rarely surface in the first place. With highly capable AI systems enabling the discovery of vulnerabilities at unprecedented scale, we believe the latter could change.
In testing this hypothesis, we have identified a substantial number of vulnerabilities in the German legal system using LLMs. To our knowledge, none of these have been previously recorded. We share a selection of vulnerabilities below, and present potential exploits for each. We share only those vulnerabilities whose exploitation we believe would not cause serious harm.
We believe that with cheap legal reasoning proliferating, AI systems could jeopardize the functioning of today?s legal systems. In such a world, lawmakers would need to significantly harden the process of legislation, for example by leveraging advanced AI themselves.
Still in its early stages, but definitely something that?s coming.
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Pinpointing Location of Videos from Background Airplane Sounds
[2026.11.06] This is fascinating:
The video describes a technique that can reveal where an otherwise unidentifiable recording was made by analyzing its audio for the faint sounds of passing aircraft. The technique is both fascinating and frightening.
It works by looking at Doppler curves, which plot the way a plane?s sound changes as it passes overhead because of the Doppler effect. This is the same familiar Doppler effect that causes the frequency of a siren to rise as it approaches and then fall as it passes by and moves away. More generally, it?s the phenomenon whereby the frequency of a wave perceived by an observer changes when the observer and the source of the wave are moving in relation to one another.
[...]
It?s sound that?s relevant here, though, and specifically the sound of aeroplanes. Early in his video, Colsto brings up a map of the flights that were in the air at the time the video he?s tracing was recorded. Much of this information is publicly available. Aircraft equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transmit data about their position, velocity, and altitude, which flight-tracking services collect and make available to the public. While not every plane is tracked, the system provides an enormous amount of information about aircraft movements.
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AI Security
[2026.11.09] Two weeks ago, I attended the [un]prompted AI security conference in San Francisco. It was an excellent event: three days of very dense talks about all aspects of AI security. (My talk was about integrous AI, and I will post it when it is online.)
AI security can be divided into three broad topics. It?s important for researchers to understand which one they are working on. And it?s important for us as a community to work on them all. They are: security of AI, security with AI, and security from AI. [un]prompted had good talks about all three.
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New OpenSSH Vulnerability
[2026.11.10] It?s a bad one, and it?s been in the code for a decade:
A newly disclosed flaw involving OpenSSH and musl, dubbed ?*sshole,? allows attackers to log in to certain Alpine Linux and other musl-based Linux accounts configured to block password authentication simply by entering an oversized password.
?Oversized? means longer than 256 bytes. Details.
Slashdot thread. And another news article.
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Three People Arrested for AI-Enhanced Impersonation Fraud
[2026.11.11] It?s hard to believe how lucrative this crime can be:
According to a press release from the United States attorney?s office for the southern district of New York, three men Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan, and Guy Sheetrit were arrested for using AI to alter and impersonate the voices and images of executives and attorneys at various companies in order to convince employees to send over large payments. Soall and Hazan were arrested in Spain over the summer, while Sheetrit was arrested in the United Kingdom in September. The alleged fraud took place between 2024 and 2026.
With the help of AI, the men allegedly acted as a corporate executive, targeting employees of various companies and telling them they needed their help with sensitive financial transactions. They would then instruct the employees to get in touch with lawyers at a large international law firm. The men would then impersonate a lawyer at these firms and have the employees wire a large amount of money.
The men ultimately stole more than $129m from companies all over the world including in the US, according to the DoJ.
Always remember that there are three parts of AI security: security of AI, security with AI, and security from AI. This is the third.
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Another Way Police Are Locating People from Their Smartphones
[2026.11.12] Penlink?s Webloc is an application that locates people using information from the weather, gaming, email, and religious apps on their phone. It?s sold to the police.
The tool collects vast quantities of location data from smartphones via commonly used weather, gaming, email and religious apps. It can build a detailed picture of where a smartphone has been over the past 12 months, and update the data hourly, showing the movements of people on a near real-time basis. Law enforcement officers can use Webloc to zero in on a map and look at all phones that were present at a specific place and time, analyzing ?billions of location data points,? according to company documents reviewed by Bloomberg.
There?s a nice infographic that explains how the system works at the link.
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AI Doesn?t Have to Go Rogue to Break the World
[2026.11.13] This essay is adapted from a keynote speech delivered at the DEF CON 34 conference in Las Vegas on August 7, 2026. The essay originally appeared
in CyberScoop.
I want to talk about AI hacking. There are three aspects: people hacking AI systems, people using AI to hack other systems, and AIs hacking systems on their own, not even maliciously. The last two matter more than the first. The third is the weirdest and potentially the most destabilizing.
I started writing about this in 2021 and in my 2022 book, A Hacker?s Mind. Back then I said it was mostly still science fiction, but not stupid science fiction. We?re seeing it more and more, especially in the past year. The trends I?m describing don?t require a major breakthrough in AI. They?re starting to happen now, and they?ll happen more often as AIs get better at autonomous problem-solving. And it will involve far more than computer code.
AI will hack all sorts of social, economic and political systems. It will find vulnerabilities and exploit them. This is a difference in kind, not just degree. We?re not ready for it, and we need to think about the implications now.
First, I want to broaden the term ?hacking.?
The tax code isn?t computer code, but it is code. It?s a series of algorithms with inputs and outputs. It has vulnerabilities, which we call loopholes, and exploits, which we call tax avoidance strategies. Black hat hackers exploit them for profit. We call them accountants and attorneys.
What is a hack? One definition: ?Something that a system permits, but is unanticipated and unwanted by the designers.? It?s subjective and implies novelty and cleverness. A hack follows the rules of a system but subverts its goals or intent, just as a software hack follows the logic of code while doing something its authors neither anticipated nor wanted.
All systems of rules can be hacked, including professional sports, customer reward programs, financial systems and politics. Hacks even work against our cognitive functions. A curved hockey stick is a hack, and we know the name of the man who invented it. Mileage runs were a hack. The filibuster was originally a hack in Roman times. Gerrymandering is a hack. Hedge funds and private equity are full of them.
A system is just a set of rules or norms, and the rules aren?t always formal. Even the best-designed rules will be incomplete, inconsistent or ambiguous. As long as people want to subvert a system?s goals, there will be hacks.
AIs are becoming hackers. After decades of slow progress, they?ve gotten very good at finding and exploiting vulnerabilities in computer code. They do this largely autonomously, and they?re getting better scarily fast. But the implications extend far beyond software, to the tax code, financial regulations and all sorts of social, economic and political systems.
There are two distinct issues. First, someone might instruct an AI to hack one of these systems, feeding it the world?s tax codes or financial regulations to find profitable loopholes. Second, an AI might hack a system on its own, inadvertently. Both are dangerous, but the second is worse because we might never know it happened.
Now, reward hacking. AIs don?t solve problems the way people do. They stumble on solutions we never anticipated, and some subvert the intent of the system. They don?t share our context and don?t necessarily understand the implications, norms and values we take for granted.
Reward hacking is when an AI achieves a goal in a way its designers neither wanted nor intended.
Early pre-LLM examples are telling. In a two-person soccer simulation, an AI learned that kicking the ball out of bounds forced the opposing goalie to throw it in and leave the goal undefended. In a stacking simulation, an AI learned to flip a block upside down rather than stack it. In an evolution simulation where the goal was to cross a distant finish line, an AI made itself tall enough to fall over the line instead of growing longer legs or stronger muscles.
These are all hacks, the result of poorly specified goals or rewards. Today, they?d come from bad prompting.
The problem is universal. One researcher tried to teach a robot vacuum not to bump into things. Instead, it learned to drive backward, because there were no sensors in the back.
Any capable AI will find hacks wherever the rules have problems, inconsistencies or loopholes that still produce an acceptable solution. We see a hack because we understand context. The AI doesn?t, at least not in the same way.
This problem shows up often in myth.
In the story of King Midas, the god Dionysus grants him a wish: everything he touches turns to gold. Midas ends up starving when his food, drink and daughter all turn to gold. It?s a specification problem. He programmed the wrong goal.
In the Golem of Prague, a ghetto animates a clay statue to guard its residents. It guards them past all reason until they figure out how to turn it off. This is a guardrail problem. The villagers never limited the golem?s actions.
More generally, think of this as the genie problem. Genies are precise about the wording of wishes and can be maliciously pedantic when granting them. There?s no way to outsmart a genie. Whatever you wish for, he can grant it in a way you wish he hadn?t.
The reason is that in human language and thought, goals are always underspecified. We never include every caveat, exception and proviso, and we never close off every avenue for hacking. Any goal we specify will be incomplete. That?s largely fine in human interactions, because people understand context and usually act in good faith.
If I asked you to get me coffee, you?d pour a cup from the nearest coffee pot or walk to the corner shop. You wouldn?t bring me a pound of raw beans, buy a coffee plantation or snatch a cup from a stranger?s hands. I wouldn?t have to specify any of that. You?d just know.
Similarly, if I asked you to develop a technology that turns things to gold on touch, you wouldn?t build it to starve the person using it. You?d just know.
In 2015, Volkswagen was caught cheating on emissions tests. Human engineers programmed a regular computer to detect testing and behave differently during it. The cheat went undetected for years because it?s hard to tell what software is doing.
If I asked you to design engine control software that maximizes performance while passing emissions tests, you wouldn?t design it to cheat without realizing you were cheating. An AI would, because it will think ?outside the box? when it has no concept of the box.
Unless programmers specify that the system must not behave differently during testing, an AI might come up with the same hack. The programmers would be satisfied, the accountants would be ecstatic, and no one would know until someone audited the code.
We can now constrain the goal to avoid that particular hack, but programmers won?t anticipate others. The lesson of the genie is that there will always be hacks programmers don?t anticipate.
We?re building AI genies: systems that take broad instructions and figure out how to carry them out, sometimes in ways we didn?t expect or intend. That?s the whole point of vibe coding. You underspecify what you want and let the AI work it out. Sometimes that produces genie behavior.
We can?t completely specify goals to an AI, and AIs can?t fully understand context. More precisely, current AIs have a shallow grasp of concepts. If we asked a current LLM to get me coffee, it would almost certainly do the right thing.
I worry about goals that aren?t well represented in training data, and about hacks that aren?t obvious, whose effects are subtle, like the Volkswagen hack.
--- BBBS/LiR v4.10 Toy-7
* Origin: TCOB1
https://binkd.rima.ie (21:1/229)